President Yushchenko was in Chust the other day, observing the 70th anniversary of the founding of Carpatho-Ukraine. This was a short-lived federation created in the Carpathian Mountains on the eve of World War II. For this post, I’m including excerpts from an unpublished article I’ve written on Ukraine and Ukrainian-Americans during WWII. It still needs a bit of editing, but will hopefully give a quick overview of the politics surrounding Carpatho-Ukraine. In the interests of space, I’ll put most of the excerpt below the fold. The material is drawn mainly from Ukrainian and Ukrainian-American newspapers and journals of the period.

“The OUN [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists] suffered a massive setback in May of 1938 with the assassination of its leader Yevhen Konovalets. While he was dining at an outdoor café in Rotterdam, an assassin, almost certainly an agent of the Soviet GPU (precursor to the KGB,) slipped a bomb into his pocket. The explosion killed Konovalets and wounded two passers-by. It also brought tremendous organizational troubles to the OUN. The Provid immediately declared Andrei Melnyk his successor. Diaspora nationalists accepted Melnyk with unanimity, but the choice was less popular among the younger, more militant activists in Poland, who favored nationalist leader Stepan Bandera. Differences in temperament and tactics would increasingly polarize the OUN over the following two years, though diaspora nationalists were largely unaware of the incipient split.”

“Despite these internal differences, the OUN remained united in its tactical alliance with Germany. They were particularly encouraged by the writings of Alfred Rosenberg, a Nazi theorist and head of the party’s foreign office. A Baltic German who shared the OUN loathing of the Soviets, Rosenberg hoped to build a cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union through the construction of a Greater Ukraine, Greater Finland, Belorussia and “Baltikum.”

The Munich Pact of September 1938 provided OUN nationalists with the first fruits of their collaboration. Encouraged by the Germans, activists within Carpatho-Ruthenia began agitating immediately for autonomy from Czechoslovakia. This was granted on November 15, 1938, and the federated state renamed itself Carpatho-Ukraine. The Germans gave the larger cities in the region to Hungary, but the OUN was still gratified to receive a sliver of land around the city of Khust. The new government, under Premier Augustine Voloshyn, was closely aligned with the OUN and moved quickly to suppress Russophile political movements. Nationalists from Galicia poured into Carpatho-Ukraine, helping to form the Carpathian Sich, a poorly-equipped defense force of fifteen thousand volunteers. Intelligentsia from the diaspora made pilgrimages to the new state, returning with glowing reports of progress.

Hitler despised the Slavs, and his support for Rosenberg’s strategy was always tentative at best. When diplomatic circumstances changed in Eastern Europe, he sacrificed Carpatho-Ukraine without hesitation. By offering it up to Hungary, Hitler both rewarded a key ally and mollified the Soviets, who were troubled by this new “Ukrainian Piedmont” on their flank. On the fifteenth of March, in the face of a Hungarian invasion, Voloshyn declared independence. Despite a brave, doomed resistance from the Carpathian Sich, Hungary seized control of Carpatho-Ukraine and wasted no time liquidating the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the region.” …

The Ukrainian-American reaction to Carpatho-Ukraine:

The Second World War began for most Americans with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. For Ukrainian-American nationalists, the first shots of the war were fired by the Carpathian Sich during the defense of Khust. Though an inconsequential event in the minds of other Americans, the founding of Carpatho-Ukraine had loomed large in the consciousness of Ukrainian-American nationalists. It was the first non-Communist Ukrainian government in almost two decades and a potential “Ukrainian Piedmont.” In November 1938, the ODWU organized a “Committee for the Defense of Carpatho-Ukraine” and sent Eugene Stotzko as a representative to the new government, along with gifts including five vehicles. In the U.S., they raised funds to purchase weapons for the regime and finance mining projects in the region. Dr. Luka Myshuha, senior editor of Svoboda, also traveled to Carpatho-Ukraine in November. He carried credentials from the UUOA representing all “Americans of Ukrainian descent.” His activities during the visit would later become the subject of much controversy.

The sack of Carpatho-Ukraine shocked diaspora nationalists. Their lobbying had been influential in the decision of the International Conference in Berlin to award autonomy to Carpatho-Ukraine, and they attempted to sway the Germans with telegrams such as that of the UNA, which “vigorously” protested against the “high-handed imperialistic designs of Hungary and Poland.” Unsurprisingly, their protests fell on deaf ears. Many nationalists came away disillusioned and embittered. “For Ukrainians, the Epopoea of Carpatho-Ukraine destroyed whatever faith they still retained in international guarantees.”

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was even more demoralizing. While the loss of Khust robbed Ukrainian nationalists of a potential base of operations, the Soviet seizure of “western Ukraine” placed their spiritual homeland squarely under the thumb of their most hated adversary; (interestingly, the Pact cut both ways, with the treaty costing domestic Communists support from Jews, Poles and Ukrainians.) The only hopeful note Ukrainian Weekly could find in the situation was that:

. . .the so-called Western democracies, including America, are likely to begin to take some interest in the national aspirations of the 33 million Ukrainians under Moscow’s misrule. There will no longer be any reason for them to ignore or gloss over the terrible conditions under which the Ukrainians are forced to exist over there, as they have done in the past.

The reference to “so-called Western democracies” reflected a widespread cynicism many nationalists felt after the disappointments of the Paris Peace Negotiations, the impotence of the League of Nations and the general indifference of the West to the Great Famine.

Until the fall of Carpatho-Ukraine and the Non-Aggression Pact, Hitler had seemed to many Ukrainian nationalists a more reliable hope for an independent Ukraine than the “so-called democracies.” Though not vocally in support of Hitler, they did at times reprint his words of support for a “Greater Ukraine” and many admired his perceived success in unifying and strengthening Germany. During the Depression, ODWU periodicals had at times been critical of the “atomistic theory of society of the democratic doctrine,” contrasting it negatively with Mussolini’s Italy. On a personal level, many ODWU members were strongly pro-Nazi. However, the twin betrayals of Carpatho-Ukraine and Molotov-Ribbentrop robbed Ukrainian-American nationalists of any faith they had in Hitler.
While their European counterparts continued to place their faith in Nazi collaboration, the political and ideological orientation of the ODWU and affiliated nationalists groups changed radically. The anger nationalists felt at German betrayal was intense and vocal. A June 1939 editorial by Myshuha was representative.

It is therefore absurd to speak about Germany assisting the Ukrainian cause financially. It is equally absurd to speak of any political assistance. This is especially true now, in the light of the tragic fate of Carpatho-Ukraine. . . the Ukrainian people will never forgive not only Hungary and Poland, which assisted in this destruction, but also Germany.

ODWU leader V. S. Dushnyk, once arrested as an Abwher spy in Belgium during the early 1930s, likewise abandoned any sympathy for Germany.

Ukraine was selected as the most precious pearl to be won by those conquests. But in order to mask her plans, Germany tried to flatter her future victims with promises of ‘sympathy’, ‘amity’, and even ‘protection.’ Thus did Germany deal with Carpatho-Ukraine. But when the show-down came, Germany ‘sold’ the territory to Hungary and Poland. . . And there lies the ruthlessness of Germany’s plan to conquer the Ukrainian people.

However, while the ODWU had abandoned any hope in Hitler, they were still theoretically subordinate to an organization in semi-overt collaboration with Germany. In an attempt to rationalize this conflict and answer public criticism of the OUN-ODWU alliance, the ODWU, Gold Cross of ODWU, and the Young Ukrainian Nationalists (MUN) passed a joint resolution at their July 1939 conference declaring:

Because Ukrainians will be affected directly or indirectly, and because they have no state, they try to find assistance in all countries. But the Ukrainian Independence Movement is based on no foreign ideologies, or international blocs, and especially it has nothing in common with the ideologies which now predominate in Germany and Italy.

OUN nationalists were not in sympathy with Hitler, ODWU nationalists explained to critics. “What they count upon is an opportunity to free Ukraine in the general upheaval.”

From the fall of Carpatho-Ukraine onward, Ukrainian-American nationalists increasingly emphasized democracy in their stated ideologies, and some began to view the United States as the best hope for Ukrainian independence. The diaspora’s largest youth organization, the Ukrainian Youth League of North America (UYL-NA) held their annual convention in September 1939. A leadership slate led by ODWU-UNA nationalists passed a resolution stating:

“As American citizens of Ukrainian descent we assert that between democracy and any other ideology there can be no choice. Ukrainian youth, descendent of a democratic people, is ready to defend that democracy of which the United States is so proud against any state whenever necessary. . .” Olga Zadoretzky, president of the ODWU youth organization, MUN, likewise affirmed that “The character make-up of the Ukrainian people is essentially democratic as witnessed by their methods of government throughout the centuries.” The broader ODWU-influenced press, such as Svoboda and Ukrainian Weekly, also emphasized democracy in their articles during the period.

I’m amazed if anyone is still reading! The remainder of the article focuses on the struggles of Ukrainian-Americans to support the cause of an independent Ukraine while still remaining loyal to the United States and its war effort. This was challenging, as the two greatest impediments to Ukrainian independence — the USSR and Poland — were essential US allies.